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RECENT DECISIONS
BusINEss AssoCIATIONs-PARTNERSHIP-CLAIMS AGAINST PARTNER WHo
AssERTS OOANCY-An adult partner sought dissolution of the partnership,
contribution of monies according to the contract, determination of liabilities for
debts, ascertainment of respective interests, and an accounting from the infant
partner. The infant partner asserted his infancy, disavowed the contract, and
moved to dismiss the action. Held, motion granted except as to plaintiffs demand
for a dissolution and accounting. Sacco v. Schallus, 11 N.J. Super. 197, 78 A.
(2d) 143 (1950).
Partnership contracts with infants are, in general, voidable at the election
of the infant partner within a reasonable time after he becomes of age.1 Such
an election may be manifested by either a voluntary disavowal or as a defense
to an action brought against him by either partnership creditors or an adult
partner.2 However, in actions by creditors of the firm, it is generally conceded
that the infant's contributions to the assets of the firm are irrevocably subject
to the claims of such creditors, even though he is completely relieved of all
personal liability for such debts both to his copartners and to the firm creditors.3
This is based largely on a policy of stabilizing commercial transactions and
protecting those not directly associated with the infant.4 The courts are divided,
however, as to whether or not an infant partner may recover his contributions
from his adult partner. Some courts follow the view that there can be no recovery of such contributions in the absence of fraudulent conduct on the part of
the adult, 5 while other courts hold that the infant may recover his contributions.11
However, the value of any benefits received by the infant must be deducted
from such recovery. He cannot rescind the burdens and keep the benefits he
has received under the contract.7 It has been held that payment for personal
services to the partnership cannot be recovered by the infant partner.8 This is
out of line with the usual rule that the infant partner is entitled to recover for
everything of value which he has contributed, but seems to be based on a policy
designed to give some relief to the adult partner, who is already in an uncertain
lLatrobe v. Dietrich, 114 Md. 8, 78 A. 983 (1910); Carolina Tel. & Tel. Co. v.
Johnson, (4th Cir. 1948) 168 F. (2d) 489; Mutual Bank & Trust Co. v. Stout, (Mo. 1950)
231 S.W. (2d) 274.
2 Jennings v. Stannus, (9th Cir. 1911) 191 F. 347; Potter v. Florida Motor Lines,
(D.C. Fla. 1932) 57 F. (2d) 313; Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Allen, (3d Cir.
1939) 108 F. (2d) 961.
3 MEcHEM, LAw oF PARTNEnsmP §49 (1920).
4 Gay v. Johnson & Badge, 32 N.H. 167 (1855).
5 Ex parte Tailor, 8 DeG. M. & G. 254, 44 Eng. Rep. 388 (1856); Adams v. Beall,
67 Md. 53, 8 A . 664 (1887).
6 Sparman v. Keim, 83 N.Y. 245 (1880); Kuipers v. Thome, 182 lli. App. 28 (1913);
Thomas v. Banks, 224 Mich. 488, 195 N.W. 94 (1923).
7 Sparman v. Keim, supra note 6; Shirk v. Shultz, 113 Ind. 571, 15 N.E. 12 (1888);
Lyghtel v. Collins, 11 Ohio Dec. Rep. 161 (1891); Thomas v. Banks, supra note 6.
8 Page v. Morse, 128 Mass. 99 (1880); Lyghtel v. Collins, supra note 7.
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position and at a possible disadvantage when dealing with the infant. The
view that an infant may recover his contributions would seem to be more in
accord with the basic reasons for protecting minors from improvident contracts
entered into at the instigation or under the influence of more experienced, and
possibly unscrupulous, adults. The holding of the principal case that there is
ordinarily no duty, in the absence of fraudulent conduct on the part of the
infant, to place the adult partner in statu quo, is in accord with this view. To
require the infant to place the adult partner in statu quo would, in effect,
deprive the infant of much of the benefit of his privilege. The rule that an
infant partner may disavow his contract and recover his contributions from the
adult partner as well as escape liability for debts of the firm is a harsh one, leaving the adult partner the alternatives of eithe~ being successful in the venture
or bearing all the risk himself, regardless of the innocence or good intentions
of the adult. 9 The result and stated objective10 of such a policy must be the
almost total discouragement of partnerships between adults and minors.

Harold S. Lentz, S.Ed.

9 However, some measure of relief is afforded, as in the principal case, by requiring
an accounting of the infant partner when he has been active in the management of the :6.rm.
10 Niemann v. Deverich, 98 Cal. App. (2d) 787, 221 P. (2d) 178 (1950).

